China's rare earth export pause runs out Nov. 10: what magnet, battery and electronics sourcing teams should do now

The details

What is suspended, and until when. On Oct. 9, 2025, China’s Commerce Ministry (MOFCOM), partly with the customs administration, issued six export-control announcements. A joint notice on Nov. 7, 2025 (No. 70 of 2025) suspended all six through Nov. 10, 2026, according to a summary by regulatory consultancy CIRS Group. The suspended measures cover:

What is already in force. China’s April 2025 controls were never paused. They require case-by-case licenses for seven medium and heavy rare earths, namely samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium and yttrium, including their metals, oxides, alloys, compounds and permanent magnet materials, Mining Technology reported. According to Tech Times, shipments of yttrium, dysprosium and terbium fell about 50% after those controls, Japan received about 4% of its normal dysprosium supply and Germany none, and yttrium oxide outside China reached about $1,100 per kilogram by May, roughly 140 times its earlier level.

No signal from Beijing yet. MOFCOM’s Sept. 28 announcement extended the U.S.–China trade truce to Jan. 10, 2027, but it did not explicitly mention the rare earth measures, according to an Oct. 14 FXStreet analysis. Analysts describe three options: extend the suspension, reinstate controls on selected elements or end uses, or restore the full October 2025 package. FXStreet notes that a lapse would mean wider licensing requirements, not a blanket export ban. Startup Fortune reports that license applications could take months, and that Chinese negotiators have reportedly linked approvals for specialized magnets to U.S. limits on AI chip exports.

China has also used the existing licensing system against specific companies. In June it placed MP Materials and USA Rare Earth on a dual-use export control list, and in July 14 European entities faced similar measures, FXStreet reported.

Prices are already moving. Outside China, Fastmarkets assessed terbium oxide at $5,000–8,000 per kilogram in early October, up 41% in a week from $4,200–5,000. Dysprosium oxide rose to $2,500–3,500 from $1,910–2,500, and ferro-dysprosium to $2,750–3,850 from $1,375–2,100. Fastmarkets tied the jump to U.S. defense-related buying ahead of Pentagon restrictions in January and to scarce non-Chinese supply. European erbium prices, one of the suspended elements, rose about 50% from early June to August as manufacturers bought ahead of the deadline, FXStreet reported, citing the Financial Times. Inside China, the industry association’s price index stood at 263.6 on Oct. 9, below an April peak near 310, Rare Earth Exchanges reported.

The U.S. defense deadline lands seven weeks later. From Jan. 1, 2027, DFARS clause 252.225-7052 bars defense contractors from delivering covered material that was mined, refined, separated, melted or produced in China, Russia, North Korea or Iran. For neodymium-iron-boron and samarium-cobalt magnets it covers the entire supply chain from mining to finished magnet. Until Dec. 31 the restriction covers only melting and later production steps.

Concentration hasn’t changed much. China produced about 69% of mined rare earths in 2025 and processes up to 90%, according to GlobalData figures cited by Mining Technology. The IEA has estimated that full implementation of China’s controls could expose up to $6.5 trillion of annual industrial output outside China, with automotive accounting for over $3 trillion, Startup Fortune reported. That is exposed value, not a forecast of losses.

What procurement teams should do

• Map exposure below tier 1. Ask suppliers of motors, actuators, sensors, speakers, hard drives, battery packs and lighting whether their parts contain Chinese-origin rare earths or magnets, and whether the content could exceed 0.1% of the part’s value. Many tier-1 suppliers will not know without asking their magnet makers.
• Ask for license status in writing. For parts using the seven elements already controlled, ask suppliers whether they hold Chinese export licenses, when they expire and how much volume they cover. Treat “we have stock” as a weeks-of-cover number, not an answer.
• Set a buffer decision before Nov. 10. For critical, single-sourced parts, decide now whether to pull forward orders or hold extra safety stock, and agree in advance who carries the cost. Prices outside China are already rising, so delaying the decision is not free.
• Separate defense from commercial demand. If any part goes into U.S. defense contracts, confirm with suppliers how they will meet the Jan. 1 DFARS requirements on mining and refining. That demand is competing for the same non-Chinese supply.
• Review price and force majeure clauses. Check whether contracts allow suppliers to pass through rare earth surcharges or claim force majeure if a license is delayed, and agree index references and notice periods now. This is general guidance, not legal advice.

What to watch next

• MOFCOM’s decision by Nov. 10. An extension, a partial reinstatement or a full lapse will each be announced by the Commerce Ministry; check the wording on the 0.1% rule and on batteries, not only on rare earths.
• Jan. 1, 2027 DFARS magnet rule. Expect more defense-related buying of non-Chinese dysprosium and terbium through December.
• Jan. 10, 2027 truce expiry. The broader U.S.–China truce runs to January; how both sides handle it will shape whether rare earth licensing loosens or tightens.

The bigger picture

The Nov. 10 date falls on the same day 178 Section 301 tariff exclusions on Chinese goods expire, so teams sourcing machinery and electronics from China face two deadlines at once: one on cost and one on supply. Both sit alongside the September framework for U.S.–China tariff cuts and the trade truce that now runs to January.

For electronics categories already dealing with the memory chip shortage, this adds a second constraint on components. U.S. lawmakers are moving bills to speed domestic mining permits and create a mineral stockpile, and producers such as MP Materials and Lynas are expanding, but new refining and magnet capacity takes years. Our assessment is that procurement teams should plan for Chinese licensing to remain a recurring source of supply risk through at least 2027, whatever Beijing decides next month.